Pak’s nuclear brinkmanship: The time to act Is now!

Raju Korti
The ink had barely dried on condemnations of the latest terrorist strike in Pahalgam when Pakistan’s habitual nuclear sabre-rattling reared its head again. Defence minister Khawaja Asif reminded the world that Pakistan would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if its "existence" were threatened. Another leader, Hanif Abbasi, upped the ante, warning that 130 warheads, including the Shaheen and Ghaznavi missiles, were already "arranged" for India. As if these threats were some form of diplomatic punctuation.

As an observer of the subcontinent’s precarious geopolitics, I no longer find these threats shocking. I find them deeply, institutionally disturbing.

Pakistan’s casual invocation of nuclear weapons has become more of a pattern than a provocation. It reflects a chronic militaristic impulse rooted not just in fringe elements like the Hafiz Saeeds and Masood Azhars of the world, but worryingly, within Pakistan’s mainstream military and political establishment. The line that separates the state from its so-called non-state actors has long been blurry, perhaps deliberately so.

What we are witnessing today is not the isolated ranting of a rogue minister, but the echo of a state that uses its nuclear arsenal not as a deterrent, but as a diplomatic crutch. The danger is not just in the rhetoric --it’s in the systemic fragility of a nuclear-armed state with a soft underbelly vulnerable to chaos, radicalism, and potential implosion.

Let’s be blunt. A nuclear state that has harboured Osama bin Laden in plain sight, empowered extremist ideologies, and repeatedly collapsed into political instability is not just a regional problem -- it is a global nightmare waiting to unfold.

The United States has long feared the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. As far back as 2011, NBC News reported on America’s "snatch-and-grab" contingency plans -- military operations designed to secure Pakistan’s nukes if they were ever at risk of being compromised. That was over a decade ago. Since then, Pakistan has added to its arsenal, expanded its delivery capabilities, and -- according to a senior US official -- may soon have long-range missiles that can reach beyond South Asia.

The fact that such a country is still treated with diplomatic caution—rather than urgent international intervention -- baffles me.

Yes, the "snatch-and-grab" idea has its detractors. Former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf warned it would trigger "total confrontation." Nuclear physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy has rightly pointed out that Pakistan’s warheads are deeply embedded across tunnels, cities, and military bases. A military intervention could backfire catastrophically.

And yet, doing nothing is even more dangerous.

The world cannot afford to wait for the moment when internal strife, a terrorist breach, or an ideological takeover in Pakistan opens the floodgates to its nuclear arsenal. The scenarios once dismissed as far-fetched are now unsettlingly plausible.First, a credible international coalition -- including the US, India, and other nuclear powers -- must quietly but decisively enhance surveillance, intelligence sharing, and contingency planning specific to Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Second, pressure must be ramped up on Pakistan’s military and intelligence complex -- not just through sanctions, but through isolating key actors involved in nuclear brinkmanship and terror sponsorship.

Third, it is time to end the indulgent fallacy that separates Pakistan’s so-called ‘deep state’ from its elected state. When ministers openly talk of nuclear retaliation, and when radical groups enjoy protective patronage, the distinction is both meaningless and dangerous.

The doctrine of deterrence presumes rational actors. But rationality cannot be assumed in a state where political chaos and radicalism routinely eclipse reason. Unlike India’s declared no-first-use policy, Pakistan’s nuclear posture is alarmingly ambiguous, and its internal volatility makes it even more hazardous.

The time to secure Pakistan’s nukes -- diplomatically, strategically, and if necessary, operationally -- is not after catastrophe strikes. It is before.

The nuclear shadow over South Asia isn’t a Cold War relic. It is a living, breathing, unpredictable threat. And the next time a Pakistani minister waves the nuclear card, the world must stop brushing it off as rhetoric.

It may not be a bluff forever.