Raju Korti
When Pakistan’s Defence Minister
Khawaja Asif raised the spectre of his country being reduced to a “vassal
state” in the unfolding Iran-Israel-United States conflict, he appeared to be
projecting a future threat. In reality, he was describing a long-settled
condition.
For the uninitiated, a vassal state is a subordinate nation that
holds some internal autonomy but is dominated by a more powerful state in its
foreign policy and military affairs. Dependent on the superior power, such
states are typically obligated to provide military support, align
strategically, or adhere to dictated policies in exchange for economic and
political patronage. By this definition, Pakistan’s trajectory since the late
1970s reads less like sovereign assertion and more like calibrated dependency.
 |
| Khawaja Asif (Wikipedia grab) |
During
the Soviet–Afghan War, Pakistan positioned itself as the frontline state of the
American Cold War enterprise. The military regime of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq became
the conduit for American and Saudi money, arms, and intelligence to the Afghan
mujahideen. The arrangement suited Rawalpindi’s strategic depth doctrine. It
also entrenched structural dependence. Billions of dollars flowed in. Policy
space narrowed.
The pattern persisted through the Gulf War. While publicly
cautious, Pakistan quietly aligned with Washington’s regional architecture. Its
military elite understood the hierarchy. The price of Western military
hardware, debt rescheduling, and diplomatic shielding at forums such as the IMF
and World Bank was compliance, not confrontation.
After 9/11, the script became
explicit. Under Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan reversed overnight from Taliban
patron to indispensable American ally in the so-called War on Terror. Airbases
were opened. Intelligence pipelines were activated. Logistics corridors were
secured. In return came Coalition Support Funds and the resumption of military
aid. Public sentiment seethed. The establishment calculated.
Asif’s claim that
Pakistan might be encircled by hostile powers if Israel’s regional footprint
expands overlooks a simple truth. Islamabad has repeatedly chosen alignment
with Washington even when that choice collided with domestic narratives about
Zionism or American imperialism. If Israeli and American objectives converge
against Iran, Pakistan’s room for manoeuvre will be defined not by ideology but
by economic fragility and military calculus.
Pakistan’s elite may rail against
Zionism. The Pakistani street may detest American foreign policy. Yet at each
strategic fork, from the anti-Soviet jihad to post-9/11 counter-terrorism
cooperation, the state has fallen in line with Washington’s priorities. That
pattern is not ideological affinity. It is structural dependence.
It is also
inaccurate to suggest that the United States is simply captive to a monolithic
Zionist force. There is indeed an influential and highly organised pro-Israel
lobby in the United States. Groups such as American Israel Public Affairs
Committee operate through lobbying, campaign contributions, and public
advocacy, much like the National Rifle Association or AARP. The American Jewish
community constitutes roughly 2 percent of the population but is politically
engaged and well represented in policymaking circles. However, to argue that
global powers are held hostage by Zionism collapses complex institutional dynamics
into conspiracy shorthand. American Middle East policy reflects strategic
calculations, domestic politics, energy security concerns, and alliance
commitments. Israel is a critical ally, but not a puppeteer.
Even if one accepts
that Israeli pressure has nudged Washington into confrontation with Iran, the
more pertinent question is Pakistan’s agency. Would Islamabad defy American
sanctions regimes? Would it risk IMF programmes or FATF scrutiny to back Tehran
materially? History suggests otherwise.
What hurts Pakistan’s ego most is not
external pressure. It is the awareness that strategic autonomy has long been
traded for economic survival. The contradictions are stark.
Pakistan once
nurtured the Afghan Taliban as a lever against Indian influence in Kabul. Today
it battles the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which draws ideological sustenance
from the same ecosystem. Islamabad demands action from the Taliban government
in Afghanistan while denying that its own past policies incubated cross-border
militancy.
In Balochistan, the state confronts a long-running insurgency fuelled
by grievances over resource extraction, political marginalisation, and security
excesses. The province is central to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,
itself a product of dependency on Beijing as an alternative patron. Thus,
Pakistan juggles two suzerains. It balances American security expectations with
Chinese economic leverage, while domestic fault lines widen.
These are not
symptoms of encirclement by Israel, India, Afghanistan, and Iran acting in
concert. They are manifestations of internal policy incoherence.
Asif’s warning
that an Israeli victory could align India, Afghanistan, and Iran against
Pakistan stretches plausibility. India and Iran share limited strategic
convergence beyond transactional concerns. Tehran’s relations with Kabul remain
fraught over refugees and water disputes. Afghanistan under the Taliban has
little ideological affinity with New Delhi. The idea of a seamless
anti-Pakistan bloc ignores deep fissures among these states.
More importantly,
Pakistan’s vulnerability does not stem from an Israeli tank column reaching its
border. It stems from economic precarity, overreliance on external bailouts,
and a security doctrine that oscillates between patronage and paranoia.
If
Pakistan’s leadership were candid, it would admit that alignment with
Washington during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Gulf War, and the
post-9/11 era was not coerced but chosen. It was deemed rational within the
logic of regime survival and institutional interest. The cost was diminished
autonomy in foreign and security policy.
To describe the current Iran crisis as
an externally imposed plot risks evading that history. Pakistan does not face
the prospect of becoming a vassal state because of Israel’s ambitions. It
confronts the consequences of decades spent outsourcing strategic security to
larger powers while cultivating domestic narratives of defiance.
Khawaja Asif’s
warning may resonate with nationalist sentiment. It does not alter the
structural reality. Sovereignty is not lost in a single war. It is eroded
through repeated bargains where expediency outruns independence.
Pakistan
crossed that threshold long ago.