Raju Korti
When I first examined the Board
of Peace proposal, I saw an idea that reflects both ambition and unresolved
tension. At its core, the board is meant to shepherd Gaza’s fragile ceasefire
into a durable peace by overseeing disarmament of Hamas, reconstruction of
civil society, establishment of governance structures, and deployment of an
international security force. The United Nations Security Council endorsed a
temporary mandate for it through 2027, but the initiative is clearly shaped in
the image of its chief architect, President Donald Trump, who will chair the
board and call many of the shots.
At the same time, several major players have expressed reservations or declined outright. France, under President Emmanuel Macron, has declined the invitation, voicing concerns that the board’s charter goes beyond a Gaza focus and could undercut the United Nations’ role in global peace architecture. Other traditional US allies in Europe are “weighing” their positions carefully, with Germany consulting EU partners before committing. The United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil and others have been invited but are studying the proposal and its implications before signalling full support.
In this unfolding geography of support and hesitation, the stakes for each country vary. For the United States, the board is not just about ending violence in Gaza; it is an attempt to reshape multilateral peace efforts around a new institutional form that places Washington, and Trump in particular, at its centre. Critics argue that this could weaken the UN’s traditional peace-making role because the board’s powers and wide mandate appear to extend beyond just Gaza.
For India, an invitation represents diplomatic balancing: New Delhi can engage in an initiative aimed at peace and reconstruction while navigating its own ties with key partners. India’s strategic interest in the Middle East, including energy and diaspora concerns, means participation could bolster its global profile if handled carefully. Russia’s reaction is more cautious; Moscow has acknowledged it has received an invitation and is assessing the “nuances” of the proposal, mindful of its own geopolitical rivalry with the U.S. and its war in Ukraine.
The position of Israel, arguably the most directly affected state, is complicated and perhaps the most telling. On one level, Israel’s government was invited to be part of the board. Yet the response from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been critical, particularly of the board’s composition, which includes countries like Turkey and Qatar that Israel views with deep suspicion. Netanyahu emphasised that this initiative was not coordinated with Israel and runs contrary to its policy positions. At home, hardline figures like the finance minister have rejected the board outright, favouring military action against Hamas instead.This is where Israel’s misgivings with the United States emerge most vividly. The two allies, long aligned on security issues, are at odds about the role of third-party international actors in Gaza’s future. While the U.S. pushes a multilateral reconstruction and oversight mechanism, Israel fears that such a board could dilute its security prerogatives and legitimacy in the eyes of Arab and Muslim states. Publicly, the U.S. underscores the board’s peace goals; privately, Israeli leaders have signalled discomfort with external actors who have historically supported Hamas or are hostile to Israeli strategic interests.
Beyond these headline dynamics, there are deeper peripheral issues that any serious analysis must acknowledge. First, the board’s financing model, which reportedly offers permanent membership in return for contributions of at least $1 billion, raises concerns about equity and influence. Wealthier states could dominate decision-making, while poorer countries may be relegated to short terms with limited impact. Second, the absence of Palestinian representatives in initial governance discussions, according to some reports, fuels criticism that the board risks making decisions about Gaza without adequately involving those whom its decisions will affect most. Finally, the very context in which this board arises, a fragile ceasefire amid ongoing humanitarian crisis, means that any institutional body will be tested by the realities on the ground: food insecurity, displacement, fractured governance, and deep mistrust among the parties.
So what holds out for this proposed peace board? Its strength lies in its ambition to combine political, security and reconstruction efforts in a single forum. If widely supported and well-funded, it could offer a coherent platform to coordinate ceasefire enforcement, peacebuilding and economic recovery in Gaza.
But workability remains uncertain. The divergent interests of participating states, the burden of financing, the lack of clarity on its legal authority vis-à-vis the United Nations, and the unresolved tension between Israel and key members all pose real challenges. Participation from polarised actors like Pakistan and Turkey may complicate consensus, even as invitations to states like India and Canada indicate broad diplomatic interest.
In the final analysis, the Board of Peace sits at the intersection of aspiration and realpolitik. It embodies the desire for a new approach to conflict resolution in one of the most intractable disputes of our time. Yet its future will be determined less by its lofty goals and more by the willingness of major powers to reconcile their strategic calculations with the urgent needs of the people in Gaza.


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