"High spirits in the House of Udta Jhoomta Punjab"

Raju Korti
The latest stir inside the Punjab Legislative Assembly had less to do with legislative heft and more with olfactory speculation. The Opposition, led by the Indian National Congress, claimed that Punjab Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann addressed the House “drunk”, turning what should have been a sober exchange into a heady controversy. Mann, never one to shy away from theatrics, found himself at the centre of a debate where the proof, as they say, was not in the pudding but allegedly in the breath. The Assembly, usually echoing with policy arguments, briefly resembled a courtroom of whispers, winks, and raised eyebrows.

Mann (Wikipedia grab)

Yet, in a political culture that often thrives on exaggeration, the episode also revealed the Opposition’s flair for dramatic timing and the ruling side’s studied nonchalance. If governance is serious business, Punjab’s politicians reminded us that it is also, occasionally, comic theatre. Whether the charge holds water or evaporates like a fleeting scent, the incident has already added another anecdote to Mann’s colourful public persona, where the line between satire and statesmanship is, at times, delightfully blurred.

Thereafter, as a reminder of how enduring some impressions can be, I had written this on a blog on Mann on January 19, 2022: One must hand it to the propensity of the Aam Aadmi Party in choosing candidates that do full justice to the party's label. Going by that yardstick, its CM's face in Punjab, Bhagwant Singh Mann has to be the 'Aamest" of them all. I am presuming readers have caught on to the superlative degree. Mann's credentials are such that any journalist will give his right hand to write the man's colourful profile.

The 48-year-old MP from Punjab's Sangrur the same place from where the signatory to the historic Punjab accord, Akali Dal President late Harchand Singh Longowal hailed; has been making waves with videos that show him inebriated in the jostling crowds. Even as he is seen talking, his face flushed red, he is being held in place by supportive partymen.

There is a considerable outrage in certain quarters of Punjab that an "alcoholic" is being projected as CM's face. That too in a state that has already acquired notoriety for rampant drug abuse. Now we all know that an "alcoholic" is a sober version of the cruder "drunkard". But Sardar Bhagwant Mann dismisses all such ungenerous talk and is least bothered about the dubious reputation that precedes him.

The man has made it to the record books by arriving in the parliament drunk. It is a measure of his popularity that he still is a crowd puller with the theatrics that he used so effectively as contestant of a Laughter Show, incidentally hosted by another Sardar, Navjot Singh Sidhu. The comedy forum was fine but in the august House he clearly looked like a square peg in a round hole, if you forgive my penchant for some cheap pun. Bhagwant Singh Mann has earned the sobriquet "Pegwant Singh Mann" not for nothing.

I have no idea what is Mann's preferred brand and whether he goes for the country-made stuff or the imported one, but in 2019, Mann had reportedly promised not to touch alcohol again. Apparently, he reneged on that. Confronted by some snouty journalists about getting back to his drinking habits, Mann had a classic reply that would do any pulp film-maker proud: "At least I don't drink people's blood." Taking his justification forward, he also retorted that "no one is perfect. Look at the Congress CM. He sits with his Pakistani women friends and says cheers.

"You can't, of course, hold it against Mann for his indulgence. That may not have to do anything with his skills as a politician. I know many politicians who enjoy a drink. I particularly recall one 75-year-old politician from Maharashtra (now no more) who could down a full bottle of Scotch and still stand ramrod straight and speak minus the lisp that comes with it. Comparatively, Mann might be still learning to hold his glass.

To be even more fair to Mann, he has a number of cassettes even before the advent of digital and video era, and has hosted several satirical shows. The reason why AAP leadership dithered long before naming him as the CM face was because of its inability to find an alternative. The party, I suspect, was sort of pushed to an expedient corner with Mann winning elections consecutively in 2014 and 2019. Besides, Mann emerged as the majority choice in a phone-in poll conducted by the party.

As an aside it would be pertinent to recall the first two lines of a song tuned a few years back by one of the greatest composers of this century, Himesh Reshammiya. It is for you to decide whether the lines are chivalrous or uncharitable about the Punjabis. The lines say that after sunset, it is risky to toast the Punjabis with a glass in their hand as they tend to veer out of control. The lines run thus:
ओ ना पिलाना पंजाबियो को नाप तोल के
सूर्य अस्त, पंजाबी मस्त.

Mann calls himself a social drinker that many assert gives drinking an elite status. I am hoping that he does become the chief minister without giving up on any of the traits that make him so uncommonly common. It is worth the fun. AAP's pride will be people's envy.

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The unquiet prospect of a refugee tide into Bangladesh!

Raju Korti
I find myself looking at the unfolding West Bengal assembly elections with a sense of déjà vu, layered with unease. Elections in India are often intense, but this one feels distinctly more turbulent, almost existential. For Mamata Banerjee and her Trinamool Congress, the stakes are nothing short of political survival. For the Bharatiya Janata Party, it is an opportunity to breach what has long been a formidable bastion. Exit polls, as always, speak in discordant voices, yet there is a perceptible suggestion of a churn, even a possible upheaval.

The exodus after 1971 war (file grab)

What concerns me is not merely who forms the government in Kolkata, but the chain reaction such a verdict could set off beyond India’s borders. For decades, West Bengal has been both a destination and a transit point for migrants from Bangladesh. Estimates have varied widely, often coloured by political interpretation, but even conservative assessments suggest that several million undocumented Bangladeshi migrants reside in the state. Some figures place this number between 3 million and 10 million, though precise data remains elusive due to the very nature of undocumented migration.

If a new political dispensation were to pursue a stringent policy of identification and deportation, the implications would be immediate and profound. A reverse migration of even a fraction of these numbers would place extraordinary pressure on Bangladesh, particularly Dhaka. This is a country already grappling with economic headwinds, currency stress, and periodic political unrest. Its population density is among the highest in the world, exceeding 1,200 people per square kilometre. Urban centres are stretched, infrastructure is fragile, and employment generation struggles to keep pace with demographic realities.

To suddenly absorb a large influx of returnees, many of whom may have lived in India for years or even decades, would not merely be an administrative challenge. It would be a humanitarian, economic, and political test of considerable magnitude. Housing, employment, healthcare, and social integration would all come under strain. The spectre of informal settlements expanding around Dhaka and other cities is not difficult to imagine. Nor is the potential for social friction, particularly if returnees are perceived as outsiders in their own country.

At moments like this, history offers both perspective and caution. In 1971, during the Bangladesh Liberation War, India received an estimated 10 million refugees fleeing violence in what was then East Pakistan. States like West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura bore the brunt of this influx. India, despite its own economic limitations at the time, opened its borders and treated these refugees as guests. Camps were set up, international assistance was mobilised, and an enormous humanitarian effort was undertaken. The strain was immense, but it was managed with a combination of political will and societal resilience.

The parallel is not exact, but it is instructive. Then, India was the recipient of a refugee tide driven by conflict. Today, Bangladesh could potentially face an inward surge driven by policy enforcement across the border. The difference lies in preparedness and context. India in 1971 had the moral clarity of a humanitarian crisis unfolding next door. Bangladesh today would be dealing with a more complex situation involving identity, legality, and economic capacity.

Yet, it would be simplistic to assume that such a scenario is inevitable. Deportation at this scale is not merely a political decision. It requires legal processes, bilateral coordination, and verification mechanisms that are often painstakingly slow. Questions of documentation, proof of origin, and human rights obligations complicate any mass exercise. Even if the political intent is strong, the administrative execution is likely to be gradual and contested.

There is also the alternative scenario. If the Trinamool Congress retains power, the status quo may largely persist. Migration, both legal and undocumented, would continue to be managed in the ambiguous space it has occupied for years. Demographic shifts would remain a subject of political debate rather than immediate policy action. For Bangladesh, this would mean avoiding a sudden shock, though the underlying issues of cross-border movement would remain unresolved.

Between these two possibilities lies a spectrum of outcomes, each carrying its own implications. What is clear to me is that migration in this region cannot be viewed through a narrow electoral lens. It is deeply entwined with history, geography, economics, and human aspiration. Any abrupt attempt to redraw these patterns risks triggering consequences that extend far beyond the immediate political moment.

As I reflect on this, I am struck by the irony of borders that once opened to receive millions in a time of crisis potentially becoming conduits of return under very different circumstances. The subcontinent has lived through the upheavals of partition, war, and displacement. It has also demonstrated an ability to absorb and adapt. The question now is whether that collective memory will guide a measured approach, or whether the pressures of contemporary politics will push the region into another phase of uncertainty.The answer, perhaps, will not emerge from the ballot boxes alone. It will depend on how responsibly power is exercised once the votes are counted.

नात्यांचा नवा हिशेब: मी उपरा, म्हणूनच अनाम

राजू कोर्ती 
माझ्या स्मरणात अजूनही एक धूसर दुपार ताजी आहे. साधारण १९८३ चा काळ असावा. एका जुन्या, शांत लायब्ररीत मी वारंवार पाहत असलेले एक पुस्तक.‘उपरा’. लक्ष्मण माने यांचे ते आत्मकथन, जणू एखाद्या वेदनेचा दस्तऐवज. एक दिवस मी ते हातात घेतले आणि वाचत गेलो. पानोपानी उलगडत गेलेली जातिभेदाची निर्दयी वास्तवता, अपमानाची चिरफाड, आणि समाजाच्या कडवट नजरा. हे सर्व मनाला चटका लावून गेले. ‘उपरा’ म्हणजे केवळ बाहेरचा नाही, तर आपल्या जगात असूनही न स्वीकारलेला, अनोळखी, अनाहूत, अनाम.

तेव्हा मला वाटले होते की हा ‘उपरेपणा’ हा जातीचा, गरिबीचा आणि सामाजिक अन्यायाचा परिणाम आहे. पण आयुष्याच्या पुढच्या वळणांवर मला जाणवले. उपरेपणाची कारणे इतकी सरळ, इतकी एकरेषीय नसतात. काळ बदलतो, संदर्भ बदलतात, पण ‘उपरा’ हा शब्द मात्र त्याच अर्थाने चिकटून राहतो. फक्त त्याची कारणे बदलतात.

आज मी मागे वळून पाहतो, तेव्हा लक्षात येते की उपरा  हा केवळ जातीनं ठरत नाही; तो समाजाच्या बदलत्या ‘अल्गोरिदम’नं ठरतो. एकेकाळी नात्यांचे गणित धर्म, जात, भाषा, संस्कार यावर मांडले जात असे. पण आजचे समीकरण वेगळे आहे. पैसा, प्रतिष्ठा, रूप, पद, सत्ता, आणि प्रभाव. ज्याच्याकडे हे आहे, तो ‘आपला’; ज्याच्याकडे नाही, तो ‘उपरा’.माझ्या आयुष्यातील सर्वात कडवट जाणीव हीच.

मी सवर्ण असूनही (त्याचा अभिमान बाळगावा की लाज वाटावी हे तुम्ही ठरवा) आज उपरा आहे. कधी काळी माझ्याकडे साधनसंपत्ती होती, ओळखी होत्या, माझ्या भोवती माणसांची गर्दी होती. लोक तळहातावर घेऊन फिरवायचे. पण ज्या क्षणी या सर्व गोष्टी निसटल्या, त्या क्षणी नातीही विरघळून गेली. आज माझ्याकडे ना पैसा आहे, ना पद, ना रूप, ना प्रभाव. आणि म्हणूनच, आज मी कुणाचाच नाही.

सॅम्युएल हंटिंग्टनने ‘क्लॅश ऑफ सिव्हिलायझेशन्स’मध्ये जगातील संघर्षांची कारणे धर्म आणि संस्कृतीत शोधली. पण माझ्या छोट्याशा जगातला संघर्ष वेगळाच आहे. येथे सभ्यता नाही, तर स्थिती  बोचते . तुझ्याकडे काय आहे, आणि माझ्याकडे काय नाही, यावर नाती तुटतात, जुळतात, आणि मोडतात. आजचा माणूस विचारांच्या नव्हे, तर वस्तूंच्या आकर्षणाने जोडला जातो.

माणूस जन्मत: उपरा नसतो. त्याला उपरा बनवले जाते. हळूहळू, नजरेआड, शब्दांविना. आणि एकदा का तो या चौकटीत बसला, की त्याचे अस्तित्व नगण्य होते. अपमान हा त्याचा दैनंदिन अन्न बनतो, आणि एकाकीपणा त्याचा श्वास.

माझ्या उमेदीच्या काळात मी अनेकांना आधार दिला. तनाने, मनाने, धनाने. आई-वडील गेले आणि डोक्यावरचे अखेरचे छत्र हरपले. जीवाभावाचे दोन्ही भाऊ काळाच्या पडद्याआड गेले. आयुष्याचा आधार असलेली मोठी बहीणही निघून गेली. इतक्यावर नियती थांबली नाही; मोठ्या भावाचा उमलत्या वयातला मुलगाही हातातून निसटला. प्रत्येक आघात गिळून टाकत राहिलो -- शब्दांविना, आवाजाविना. पण या सगळ्या हानीनंतर जे उरले, ते एक खोल, न बोलता येणारे पोकळीचे जग… आणि त्यात वाढत गेलेले उपरेपण, जे हळूहळू मला नैराश्याच्या अथांग गर्तेकडे ढकलत गेले. पण आज जेव्हा मला आधाराची गरज आहे, तेव्हा माझ्या दारात येणारे पाऊलसुद्धा थांबत नाही. रस्त्यावरचे कुत्रेही कदाचित क्षणभर थांबतील; माणसं मात्र नाही.

हे सगळं लिहिण्यामागे माझा उद्देश केवळ उद्वेग व्यक्त करणे नाही. ही एक नोंद आहे. त्या उपऱ्यांची, जे समाजाच्या काठावर जगतात. जे दररोज जगतात, पण कुणाच्याच स्मरणात नसतात. ज्यांचे आयुष्य एक प्रतीक्षा बनून राहते. शेवटाच्या, मुक्तीच्या.पण मुक्ती इतकी सहज मिळत नाही. ज्याच्या वाट्याला जे आले आहे, ते भोगल्याशिवाय त्याची सुटका होत नाही. म्हणूनच उपरे जगतात किड्यांसारखे. आणि मरतातही तितक्याच शांत, तितक्याच दुर्लक्षित पद्धतीने.

The rising fury of a Super El Nino and reading its signals!

Raju Korti
I have been reading a great deal about the so-called impending Super El Niño, but most of what passes for explanation is either vague or overly general. The climate physics curiosity in me has therefore been stirred into a more careful, almost personal inquiry. When one looks beyond headlines and into the mechanics of ocean-atmosphere coupling, the unease begins to acquire shape.

(Pic representational)

In simple terms, El Niño is the periodic warming of surface waters in the central and eastern Pacific due to weakening trade winds, while La Niña is its cooler counterpart marked by strengthened winds and enhanced upwelling. These oscillations, though distant, act as a planetary thermostat. When that thermostat malfunctions at scale, the consequences ripple across continents.

What distinguishes a Super El Niño is not merely its occurrence, but its intensity. When temperature anomalies cross the two-degree threshold, the system ceases to behave like a cycle and begins to resemble a disruption. Climate models are increasingly converging on the possibility that such an event is not only likely but may already be stirring. Enough hints are visible even across India. The extreme heat in central and eastern regions is not an isolated aberration but a symptom of a larger rearrangement of atmospheric energy.

Globally, a Super El Niño would redraw the climate map. The Pacific warming injects enormous heat into the atmosphere, which then struggles to dissipate because of elevated greenhouse gas concentrations. This creates a stacking effect where each major event lifts the baseline temperature further. By the latter half of this decade, we may not be speaking of anomalies but of a new normal. Floods in some regions, droughts in others, intensified wildfires, and erratic storm tracks are all part of this redistribution of heat.

For India and its neighbourhood, the implications are both immediate and uneven. The south-west monsoon, which is delicately tied to temperature gradients between land and ocean, is likely to weaken or become erratic. The India Meteorological Department has already indicated the possibility of below-normal rainfall in parts of the country, while Skymet Weather has flagged the risk of spatial and temporal unevenness.

The geography of impact will not be uniform. Northwest and central India could see prolonged dry spells and heatwaves, with temperatures rising by 1 to 2 degrees Celsius above seasonal norms. Eastern India, already showing early heat spikes, may experience oppressive humidity combined with heat, pushing wet-bulb temperatures to dangerous thresholds. Southern peninsular India might witness short bursts of intense rainfall interspersed with dry intervals, while the Himalayan belt could face accelerated glacial melt and erratic precipitation, raising the risk of flash floods.

Neighbouring regions mirror this instability. Pakistan and Afghanistan may face severe drought conditions, while Bangladesh could oscillate between heat stress and sudden flooding. The Indian Ocean itself may warm further, feeding cyclonic activity in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal with greater intensity.

The quantum of destruction, if one must attempt to quantify it, lies not merely in isolated disasters but in systemic stress. Agricultural output could decline due to erratic rainfall and heat stress. Urban centres may face power surges due to cooling demand, alongside water shortages. Forest fire incidents could increase in central India. Public health systems will be tested by heat-related illnesses. The economy absorbs these shocks in ways that are often invisible at first but cumulative over time.

Can such a phenomenon be controlled? The honest answer from a climate physics standpoint is no, at least not in the immediate sense. El Niño is a natural oscillation. What we can control, however, is the background state on which it operates. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving land use practices, and building adaptive infrastructure can moderate the amplification. Without that, each El Niño arrives not as a visitor but as an accelerant.

The more I read and observe, the more it seems that the Super El Niño is not a distant probability but an unfolding reality. Extreme temperatures and climate fluctuations are no longer projections confined to models. They are increasingly becoming lived experiences. The signals are already here, scattered across heat maps and rainfall charts, waiting to be read with clarity rather than comfort.

The Asha they did not remember!

Raju Korti
Each time a colossus of the music firmament passes on, I find myself recoiling, not so much at the loss, but at the hurried sanctimony that follows, the facile tributes that parade familiarity without intimacy. And in the case of Asha Bhosle, it was almost as if an entire generation chose amnesia over acknowledgement, reducing an eight-decade symphony into a handful of oft-repeated refrains, when for some of us, her voice was not an accessory to memory but its very texture, its breath and pulse. To add insult to injury, songs were casually misattributed to the wrong films, the wrong composers, even the wrong years, all delivered with an air of easy authority, as though accuracy were optional and no one would know enough, or care enough, to question or protest.

I remember how, long before the marketplace discovered her versatility, she had already etched her genius in quieter, deeper grooves, especially with the mercurial O. P. Nayyar, where one could travel from Beimaan balma maan bhi jaa (1956), Chhota sa baalma (1958), Chham chham ghungru bole (1958), Puchho na hame hum unke liye (1960), Raaton ko chori chori (1965) to the intoxicating cluster of Har tukde mere dil ka, Main shayad tumhare, Yehi wo jaga hai and Muhabbat cheez hai kya (1966), a journey that was less about songs and more about an evolving aesthetic where rhythm flirted with rebellion and melody refused domestication, and yet how conveniently this chapter is footnoted, if at all, as though the arc from Aasman to Kismat was a mere prelude rather than the very foundation of her flight.

Then came the understated alchemy with S. D. Burman, where her voice seemed to acquire an inwardness, a reflective cadence, beginning with Chhayi kaari badariya (1953), moving through Humne kisi pe dore (1956), Dhalti jaaye chunariya (1957), Aan milo more piya (1958), Koi aaya dhadkan kehti hai, Kuch din pehle, Chanda re chanda re (1958), Kaali ghata chhaye mora (1959), Nazar laagi Raja, Dil laga ke, Sach hue sapne tere (1960), and culminating in the haunting austerity of Ab ke baras bhej and O panchhi pyaare (1963), where she was no longer merely singing but inhabiting silences between notes.

With Ravi, she became the voice of quiet devotion and emotional transparency, giving us Dil ki kahani rang laayi hai (1960), Raat raat bhar jaag jaag kar (1961), Halki halki sard hawa (1962), Aaj ye meri zindagi (1963), and the immortal Tora man darpan kehlaye (1965), songs that did not clamour for attention but settled into the conscience like an unspoken prayer.

Even with composers often relegated to the margins of popular recall, she found a way to dignify their compositions, whether it was C. Ramchandra with Aa dil se dil mila le and Dil lagaakar hum ye, or N. Dutta, where one encountered a remarkable spread from Aji tum aur hum (1955), Pyar khul ke nain milaye (1955), Kismat hai agar tumhare saath (1956), Chhup chhup ke dil ki dhadkan (1957), Tang aa chuke hai kashmakashe (1958), Dekhi teri duniya (1959), to Naina kyun bhar aaye and Main jab bhi akeli hoti hoon (1961), and Aap ki baate aap ki kasme (1962), each rendered with a seriousness that belied their so-called “secondary” status.

She could just as effortlessly align with the grand orchestral sweep of Shankar–Jaikishan in Chamke bijuriya garje megh (1953), Mud mud ke na dekh (1955), Saawan ban gaye nain (1961), or the lyrical finesse of Salil Chowdhury in Thandi thandi saawan ki (1956) and Bagh me kali khili (1965), and even in the briefest of associations with Babul, Khayyam, or Hemant Kumar, she left behind imprints like Baithe hain rehguzar par (1959), Do boonde saawan ki (1958), Humse hoti mohabbat jo (1965), Yeh mehfil sitaron ki (1956), Meri baat rahi mere man me and Saaqiya aaj mujhe that continue to whisper long after louder songs have faded.

I often feel the tragedy is not that we forgot these songs, but that we forgot how to listen, how to locate artistry beyond the obvious, how to recognise that before the cabarets, the chartbusters and the late rediscoveries, there existed a young, fiercely committed artiste who negotiated her place note by note, phrase by phrase. Perhaps my indignation also stems from a deeply personal space, for in those songs lies a part of my own growing up, my own apprenticeship in feeling, and if I insist on recalling this Asha, it is not to correct anyone, but to rescue something within myself from the encroaching shallowness of collective memory.

So when the next facile tribute rolls out and someone casually hums Chura liya hai tumne as though that alone defines her, I will quietly retreat into my own archive where Kaali ghata chhaye mora still gathers clouds, Tora man darpan kehlaye still reflects a searching soul, and Ab ke baras bhej still aches with distance, and I will remind myself that legends are not diminished by our forgetfulness, only our listening is.

PS: I have purposely chosen this B&W image to accentuate my point.

How about outsourcing Hormuz Toll Naka to India?

Raju Korti
The day I heard the rumour that ships might have to pay a toll to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, my first thought was very simple. Finally, the world has caught up with India.

(Pic is purely imaginary)

For years we have perfected the science of the Toll Naka. Every few kilometres a booth appears like a philosophical reminder that no ride in life is truly free. Roads, bridges and sometimes even a suspiciously short flyover come with their own toll plaza. Naturally, I imagined that somewhere between Iran and Oman a similar Naka must be under construction.

Picture the scene: A large yellow board reads: “Welcome to Hormuz Toll Plaza. Please keep FASTag active.” In the middle of the sea, enormous oil tankers line up like trucks outside a Maharashtra highway toll gate during Diwali traffic. A gigantic Iranian officer waves a fluorescent baton and signals ships to slow down.

“Next vessel please. Cargo type?” “Crude oil.” “Very good. Commercial category. Please pay.”At this point the captain nervously checks whether his ship has Fastag linked to the right bank account. If not, the poor fellow must do what every Indian driver does at toll plazas. Frantically search for network to complete an online payment.

Of course there will be different lanes. One for FASTag enabled vessels. One for cash payment for nostalgic countries that still believe in physical currency. And the slowest lane of all called “Exact change only.”

I can also imagine the controversies. Some shipping companies will complain that the toll charges are too high. Others will argue that they already paid at the previous international checkpoint. A few clever captains will attempt to slip through the emergency lane pretending they are ambulances of the sea.

Television debates will erupt immediately. So called experts will shout hoarse about maritime sovereignty. Economists will calculate the cost per barrel of oil. Retired admirals will discuss whether the Toll Naka should be manned by the navy, the coast guard or a private contractor who previously managed highways near Ahmedabad.

Meanwhile the real masters of the system will quietly appear. Not diplomats. Not naval officers. Indian toll plaza managers. Within weeks the entire operation will run with clockwork efficiency. Digital receipts. Online payments. SMS alerts. And of course, a polite but firm announcement over loudspeakers.

“Dear global shipping community, kindly maintain lane discipline and keep your Fastag active. Failure to comply will result in double toll charges.

”The Indian government has clarified that no such Toll Naka exists at Hormuz. But if the world ever decides to install one, I have an humble suggestion. Please invite India to design it. After all, nobody understands toll economics better than us.

While the government clarifies that no such toll exists at Hormuz, somewhere in India our own Nitin Gadkari might be chuckling to himself at the sheer globalisation of the Toll Naka idea.

Can Maharashtra's rivers be saved from pollution?

Raju Korti
Rivers have sustained human civilisation for centuries. They provide drinking water, support agriculture, recharge groundwater and sustain ecosystems. In India they also carry deep cultural and spiritual significance. Yet many rivers today resemble drains rather than lifelines. Maharashtra’s decision to establish the Maharashtra State River Rejuvenation Authority appears to be an attempt to reverse this decline.

Mithi: Sight for sore eyes

The state cabinet recently approved the creation of this authority to oversee rejuvenation work on 54 polluted river stretches, the highest number recorded in any Indian state according to the Central Pollution Control Board’s 2025 report. The rivers include the Mithi, Kalu, Mula, Mula-Mutha, Mutha, Bhima, Pawana, Nag, Chandrabhaga and Panchganga.

These rivers represent both ecological and cultural heritage. Many such as the Bhima, Chandrabhaga and Panchganga hold sacred importance for millions of devotees. The Mithi river in Mumbai is an exception. Union Minister Nitin Gadkari once dismissed it as a mere “nullah”, reflecting the tragic condition to which it has been reduced.

The Maharashtra State River Rejuvenation Authority will function as the apex decision-making body and nodal agency for river restoration in the state. Chaired by the Chief Minister, it brings together ministers from environment, finance, urban development, water resources, industry and rural development.

In theory this structure solves a major administrative problem. River pollution involves many departments. Sewage management is handled by urban bodies. Industrial pollution falls under the pollution control board. Encroachments involve revenue authorities. Flood control is linked to water resources departments. Until now these agencies have worked in isolation. The new authority aims to coordinate them.

It will prepare river basin management plans, decide priority phases for rejuvenation, integrate existing schemes, and recommend policies on sewage treatment, industrial effluent control and riverbank demarcation. It will also address practical obstacles such as land acquisition, encroachments, power supply and project contracts.

A state executive committee and a dedicated secretariat will assist the authority. Environmental organisations such as the Bombay Natural History Society and the Mangrove Cell are expected to contribute technical inputs.

The state plans to raise about Rs 2,000 crore for river rejuvenation through the Pollution Control Board. The government itself will contribute Rs 100 crore, while 10 percent of revenue from minor mineral excavation will be diverted annually to the authority. Additional funding will be sought through corporate social responsibility contributions and blended finance. Whether this allocation is adequate remains debatable.

Cleaning polluted rivers is extremely expensive. Sewage treatment plants, interceptor drains, riverfront protection works and monitoring systems require large investments and continuous maintenance. In a state with 54 polluted stretches, Rs 2,000 crore could spread thin unless carefully prioritised. The key challenge is not only capital investment but also long-term operational costs. Treatment plants often fail because local bodies lack funds or technical capacity to maintain them.

The problems affecting Maharashtra’s rivers are neither mysterious nor recent. The causes are well documented. Untreated sewage is the largest contributor. Rapid urbanisation has overwhelmed municipal infrastructure. Many cities discharge partially treated or completely untreated sewage into rivers.

Industrial effluents add another layer of pollution. Chemical units, textile industries, sugar mills and small-scale factories often release contaminated wastewater. Solid waste dumping further degrades river health. Plastics, construction debris and household garbage frequently end up in river channels. Encroachments and urban construction narrow natural riverbeds and destroy floodplains. This reduces the river’s ability to cleanse itself and increases flooding risks. Agricultural runoff containing fertilisers and pesticides also contributes to declining water quality.

Few rivers illustrate the governance failures better than Mumbai’s Mithi river. Once a natural tidal river connecting Powai and Vihar lakes to Mahim creek, the Mithi gradually turned into a dumping channel for sewage and industrial waste. After the devastating 2005 Mumbai floods, the government launched an ambitious river cleaning and widening programme. Over the years, hundreds of crores of rupees were spent on desilting, embankment construction and beautification. Yet the river continues to remain choked with sludge and garbage.

Investigations and audits exposed irregularities in contracts and allegations of inflated bills in desilting operations. The project became synonymous with what many critics describe as the Mithi river desilting scam. For Mumbaikars the river still stands as a visible reminder of administrative failure. This history raises an uncomfortable question. If one river could not be restored despite years of attention and funding, can dozens of others be revived effectively?

India’s experience with the Clean Ganga campaign provides further caution. The Ganga Action Plan launched in 1985 and the later Namami Gange programme initiated in 2014 have together consumed billions of rupees and more than three decades of policy effort. Some improvements have been reported in certain stretches, but pollution levels remain stubbornly high in several cities including Varanasi.

Experts attribute the limited success to fragmented governance, weak enforcement against polluters, and poor maintenance of treatment infrastructure. The lesson is simple. River cleaning cannot succeed through announcements alone.

The new authority does address one important problem. It attempts to bring multiple departments under a single institutional framework. This could improve coordination and accountability. However, success will depend on three factors.

First, strict enforcement of pollution norms. Industries and municipalities must face penalties for illegal discharge. Second, functional sewage treatment systems. Building plants is not enough. They must operate efficiently every day. Third, protection of riverbanks and floodplains. Encroachments and construction near rivers must be prevented. Without these steps, rejuvenation efforts risk becoming symbolic exercises.

Governments alone cannot restore rivers. Citizens, industries, local bodies and environmental groups all have a role. Cities must manage waste responsibly. Industries must adopt cleaner technologies. Farmers must reduce chemical runoff. Citizens must stop dumping garbage into water bodies. Most importantly, rivers must be treated as living ecological systems, not as drainage channels.

If Maharashtra’s new authority can enforce this shift in thinking, it may succeed where many earlier efforts have faltered. If it becomes another bureaucratic layer without strong enforcement, the state’s rivers will continue their slow decline.

The stakes are high. Rivers are not merely water channels. They are the arteries of human life, carrying ecological, economic and cultural meaning across generations. Protecting them is not just an environmental task. It is a civilisational responsibility. 

War sold, war owned, war disowned! With no warranty!

Raju Korti
I have always believed that wars begin with great certainty and end with even greater confusion. What is unfolding inside the American administration today confirms that rule with almost theatrical precision.

Somewhere between Washington and Tel Aviv, a war appears to have been pitched, marketed and finally purchased like a questionable real estate project. The brochure promised quick returns. The terrain, as it turns out, is not cooperative.

The working belief in many diplomatic circles is simple. Israel convinced Washington that confronting Iran militarily would be manageable. Perhaps even neat. A short, decisive strike followed by a conveniently collapsing regime in Tehran. A swift demonstration of power. A new geopolitical order. Except that reality, unlike PowerPoint presentations, has a stubborn habit of resisting neat conclusions.

Iran has now made it clear that the United States may have started the war, but Tehran intends to decide when it ends. That statement alone should send a chill through the corridors of the White House because it means the timeline has slipped from Washington’s hands.

Suddenly the much advertised ten day “pause” in operations looks less like a humanitarian gesture and more like an act of strategic hesitation. Discretion has quietly stepped in where bravado once strutted about. In other words, someone in Washington may have finally realised that taming Iran is not the geopolitical equivalent of flipping a light switch.

Which brings us to the most fascinating part of this unfolding drama. The blame game. Donald Trump has already begun laying down markers. In a recent remark he said, “I don’t want to say this but I have to… Pete didn’t want it to be settled. In other words, our Sec. of War doesn’t want peace, he wants war.

”That is not exactly the ringing endorsement one expects from a commander in chief speaking about his own defence secretary. Yet in the very same breath Trump also acknowledged how the war drum began beating. “Pete, I think you were the first one to speak up and you said, ‘Let’s do it because you can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.’” Translation. The war was necessary. But it was someone else’s idea.

Trump & Hegseth: At war!

Pete Hegseth, for his part, had reportedly pushed precisely that argument earlier. The United States could not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons and therefore military intervention was unavoidable. So, the narrative now unfolding inside the American administration is breathtaking in its simplicity. The war was right. The war was necessary. But the responsibility for it is negotiable.

Meanwhile Vice President JD Vance has apparently begun pointing fingers in a different direction altogether. Across the Atlantic. In a tense phone call with Benjamin Netanyahu, Vance reportedly told the Israeli leader that the predictions which had been “sold” to Trump before the war simply had not materialised. Sources would have it that “before the war, Bibi really sold it to the President as being easy, as regime change being a lot likelier than it was.

”Reality has again proven stubborn. Despite the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the regime in Tehran has not collapsed. If anything, hardline factions have tightened their grip. The expected domino effect never happened. The Iranian state did not dissolve into convenient chaos. The revolutionary establishment simply closed ranks.

And now Washington is discovering a problem that should have been obvious from the beginning. Regime change is not a military tactic. It is a political gamble. No one in the American administration seems to have a clear picture of what Iran would even look like after a war. Who governs it. Which factions take power. Whether the country fractures or consolidates. In short, the war was apparently sold without a warranty.

The atmosphere between Washington and Tel Aviv is therefore becoming distinctly awkward. Israel pushed the narrative of an easy strategic victory. Washington bought into it. Now the battlefield is producing a far less cooperative script.

Even the information war is turning messy. When a right-wing Israeli outlet reported that Vance had shouted at Netanyahu over settler violence in the West Bank, American officials quickly suspected that the story itself had been planted to smear the vice president. Israelis denied it. So now the allies are not only debating the war. They are debating who is planting stories about whom.

If this were a television drama, the writers would probably be accused of exaggeration. But the consequences are serious. If the war drags on, Washington’s control over the strategic narrative will weaken. The United States risks looking like the senior partner who financed the project but forgot to read the fine print. Israel, meanwhile, risks appearing like the enthusiastic salesman who promised quick results.

The deeper question is about credibility. If Washington begins publicly quarrelling over who pushed the war, the global perception of American strategic coherence will take a hit. Allies will worry about impulsiveness. Rivals will sense hesitation. And Tehran will simply watch. Because from Iran’s perspective the situation is almost ideal. The Americans are debating who started the fire while the flames continue to spread.

Wars are often described as foggy. But what we are witnessing now inside the American administration is something else entirely. A war that was confidently sold. A war that is now being carefully disowned. And somewhere in between, a superpower trying to figure out who exactly wrote the sales pitch. 

Taking anti-India rant to dangerous levels!

Raju Korti
I have heard many strange arguments over the years about India and Pakistan. But every once in a while, a statement comes along that is so reckless, so devoid of strategic sense, that it deserves to be examined not as rhetoric but as a window into a troubled mindset. Former Pakistan High Commissioner to India Abdul Basit’s suggestion that Pakistan should bomb Mumbai and Delhi if the United States attacks its nuclear arsenal falls squarely in that category.

This was not a random television panellist mouthing off. Basit served as Pakistan’s top diplomat in New Delhi from 2014 to 2017. He knows India. He knows the vocabulary of diplomacy. He also knows the devastating implications of invoking nuclear retaliation against civilian centres. And yet he said it.

Abdul Basit (Wikipedia pic)

His argument was presented as a “worst case scenario”. But the reasoning that followed revealed something far more troubling than a hypothetical. It revealed a strategic logic that borders on the absurd. Basit essentially said this. If the United States targets Pakistan’s nuclear assets and if Pakistan cannot strike the US directly or hit American bases or Israel, then the fallback option is India. In other words, if you cannot hit the actual adversary, hit India. It is difficult to imagine a more bizarre articulation of deterrence theory.

Deterrence is meant to discourage an attacker by threatening retaliation against that attacker. What Basit suggests is deterrence by attacking someone else entirely. It is the geopolitical equivalent of threatening to burn your neighbour’s house because you cannot reach the person who threatened you. No credible nuclear doctrine works this way.

The remark becomes even more startling when one remembers that Pakistan’s own nuclear infrastructure has already shown vulnerabilities. During India’s Operation Sindoor, one of Pakistan’s nuclear related facilities was reportedly struck by Indian forces. That episode itself demonstrated how fragile the notion of invulnerable nuclear assets can be in a modern conflict environment.

Yet Basit’s solution to such vulnerability is not caution. It is escalation against a third party. There is another disturbing layer to his remarks. Basit also declared that in Pakistan “everyone is a jihadi”. Whether educated or poor, he said, the entire society shares this mindset.

If he meant this literally, it is a terrifying admission about the ideological environment surrounding a nuclear arsenal. If he meant it metaphorically, it still betrays the political culture that often frames Pakistan’s security discourse. Either way, the statement should alarm observers far beyond India. The timing is also revealing.

Just days before Basit’s remarks, the United States’ Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment. The report placed Pakistan among significant nuclear concerns for Washington, alongside major powers like Russia and China.US intelligence chief Tulsi Gabbard specifically flagged Pakistan’s evolving missile capabilities and its development of long-range delivery systems that could potentially reach intercontinental ranges. This matters.

For years, Pakistan has justified its nuclear arsenal as an India specific deterrent. The argument was simple. The weapons existed to counterbalance India’s conventional military superiority. But if Pakistan is now developing missiles capable of reaching far beyond South Asia, the narrative inevitably changes. Washington begins to view Islamabad not merely as a regional actor but as a potential strategic threat.

Basit’s comments inadvertently reinforce precisely that perception. If the world hears a former Pakistani envoy calmly discussing the bombing of foreign cities as a fallback option, it strengthens the argument that Pakistan’s nuclear thinking is dangerously elastic.

In strategic circles, language matters. Even hypothetical scenarios reveal the frameworks within which decision makers think. And Basit’s framework suggests something alarming. Pakistan appears ready to expand the battlefield whenever it feels cornered.

There is also a deep contradiction embedded in his reasoning. Basit repeatedly called the scenario “improbable” and “out of the impossibility”. Yet he kept returning to it, elaborating on how Pakistan would respond.

When diplomats feel compelled to construct elaborate hypothetical attacks, they are usually revealing anxieties rather than strategy. The anxiety here is obvious. Pakistan fears the vulnerability of its nuclear program. It fears American scrutiny. It fears isolation. And it fears that in a crisis it may not be able to retaliate directly against a superior adversary. So, the rhetorical missile is aimed at India.

India, in Pakistani strategic discourse, often becomes the convenient substitute target whenever frustration with larger powers builds up. This pattern is hardly new. Whenever tensions spike elsewhere in the world, whether in Afghanistan, the Middle East, or Washington’s policy debates, India suddenly reappears in Pakistani rhetoric as the ultimate adversary.

It is easier to threaten Delhi than to confront the structural weaknesses of Pakistan’s own strategic position. But threats of this nature carry consequences. Even when unofficial, they feed international doubts about the safety, command structure, and ideological environment surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. They reinforce the concerns already articulated in the American intelligence assessment.

In other words, statements like Basit’s do more damage to Pakistan’s credibility than any foreign critic could. So how should India respond? The answer is simple. With calm and clarity. India does not need to match rhetorical recklessness with rhetorical outrage. Basit’s remarks are best understood as a symptom of Pakistan’s strategic frustration rather than a credible policy signal.

India’s nuclear doctrine remains clear, restrained, and anchored in deterrence. The country has repeatedly emphasised responsible stewardship of its arsenal and has avoided the kind of loose public nuclear talk that occasionally surfaces across the border. The contrast speaks for itself.

At the same time, India cannot ignore the deeper signal embedded in such rhetoric. When former diplomats begin normalising the idea of striking unrelated targets in a crisis, it suggests an intellectual environment where escalation is not fully understood. That environment is dangerous.

Ultimately, Basit’s remark is less about India and more about Pakistan’s internal strategic malaise. It reflects a country struggling to reconcile its nuclear ambitions with its geopolitical limitations. When the gap between ambition and capability becomes too wide, frustration fills the space. And sometimes that frustration speaks aloud.

In this case, it spoke in the language of nuclear threats. For a country already under scrutiny for its nuclear posture, that is perhaps the most self-destructive message it could have sent to the world.

Hormuz Faultlines and NATO’s quiet snub to Trump!

Raju Korti
At the heart of the episode lies a contradiction. Trump first "demanded" that NATO and key partners secure the Strait of Hormuz. He then conveniently dismissed their presence after their reluctance became apparent. This oscillation is as much revealing as it is damning. It suggests that Washington still seeks the legitimacy of collective action even when it increasingly prefers unilateral execution. The demand, therefore, was not merely operational. It was political signalling aimed at burden-sharing and moral endorsement.

Strait of Hormuz (Wikipedia)

The response from Europe, however, has been remarkably cool. Core NATO members such as Germany and France have historically resisted deeper military entanglement in West Asian conflicts without clear multilateral mandates. Italy and Spain too have shown little appetite for direct involvement. Even United Kingdom, traditionally Washington’s closest military partner, has exercised caution, mindful of domestic political costs and the absence of a clearly defined endgame. Outside NATO, allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia have also declined participation, reflecting a broader reluctance to be drawn into a potentially escalatory conflict with Iran.

This is not an abrupt rupture. The first visible cracks in transatlantic unity arguably surfaced during the Iraq War, when the failure to find weapons of mass destruction dented American credibility. The episode seeded a durable scepticism in European capitals about intelligence claims and regime-change doctrines. What is unfolding now appears to be an extension of that distrust, sharpened by Trump’s often transactional view of alliances.

The Strait of Hormuz itself has become central because it is the artery through which nearly a fifth of the world’s oil flows. Any disruption here has immediate global consequences, from energy prices to inflationary pressures. Iran’s ability to threaten or selectively restrict passage gives it asymmetric leverage, especially after the initial US-Israeli strikes. In strategic terms, control over Hormuz is not merely about maritime security. It is about economic coercion on a global scale.

There is also a quieter question underpinning the conflict. To what extent has Washington been nudged, or even compelled, into escalation by Israel. If that perception gains ground, it complicates US diplomacy, particularly in Europe, where public opinion remains wary of being drawn into conflicts seen as externally driven. The ramifications could be long-term, affecting not just this war but future coalition-building efforts.

For NATO, the refusal is not necessarily a declaration of disunity but a recalibration of interests. European members appear unwilling to underwrite conflicts that lack clear objectives, exit strategies, or direct threats to their own security. In that sense, it is less about rejecting the United States and more about rejecting the template of intervention.

For Trump, the implications are more immediate. If the conflict stretches into a prolonged engagement, akin to another Russia-Ukraine War-type stalemate, the absence of allied backing could translate into strategic and political isolation. His assertion that the US does not need NATO sits uneasily with his earlier appeal for support. It raises a question of credibility, both internationally and domestically. A short, decisive campaign would vindicate unilateralism. A protracted one would expose its limits.

The oil dimension adds another layer. Rising prices and supply disruptions inevitably ripple across economies, including India, which depends heavily on energy imports routed through Hormuz. The safe passage of Indian vessels underscores how deeply interconnected the crisis is. For New Delhi, the priority remains stability rather than alignment, ensuring that geopolitical tensions do not translate into economic shocks.

In the final analysis, NATO’s reluctance is not a dramatic break but a subtle distancing. It reflects an alliance adjusting to a world where American leadership is no longer automatically synonymous with collective action. The Strait of Hormuz, narrow in geography, has thus widened into a test of strategic patience, alliance cohesion, and the evolving limits of power.

The quiet permission to die. With dignity!

Raju Korti
In a country where life is often held sacred beyond reason, death has long remained an awkward, almost forbidden conversation. The recent Supreme Court ruling permitting passive euthanasia in the case of Harish Rana has shifted that silence. It has given legal articulation to something deeply human, the desire not merely to live, but to die with dignity.

Rana, a young man trapped in a vegetative state for over a decade after a catastrophic accident, became the face of this dilemma. His parents, worn by years of care and the slow erosion of hope, sought permission not to end his life, but to stop prolonging his dying. The Court agreed, allowing the withdrawal of life support under strict safeguards and placing him in palliative care at AIIMS, where the process has now formally begun.

(Visual representational)

This is not euthanasia in the dramatic sense often imagined. India continues to prohibit active euthanasia, the deliberate act of ending life through medical intervention. What the Court has allowed is passive euthanasia, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment, permitting death to take its natural course. The distinction is both legal and moral. One ends life. The other ceases to artificially extend it.

India has walked this path before, though hesitantly. The case of Aruna Shanbaug, a nurse who remained in a vegetative state for over four decades after a brutal assault, first forced the judiciary to grapple with the issue. In 2011, the Supreme Court, while rejecting the plea for ending her life, laid down guidelines permitting passive euthanasia under strict judicial oversight. That judgment became the moral and legal foundation for today’s decision.

The Rana case is, in many ways, the first true operationalisation of that principle. What was once theoretical has now entered the realm of lived reality.

Globally, the landscape is uneven. Countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada allow active euthanasia or assisted dying under regulated frameworks. In contrast, India remains cautious, permitting only passive euthanasia and that too under layered safeguards involving medical boards, consent protocols and, often, judicial scrutiny.

The difference is not merely legal. It is civilisational. In the West, individual autonomy often reigns supreme. In India, decisions around life and death are embedded in family structures, religious beliefs and social expectations. The patient is rarely an isolated individual. He is a son, a parent, a responsibility.

The argument for euthanasia rests on autonomy and compassion. If life has irreversibly lost its quality, if suffering is unending and recovery impossible, should the law compel existence? The Court, in Rana’s case, appeared to answer in the negative, recognising dignity as intrinsic to the right to life under Article 21.Yet the counter-argument is equally forceful. Who decides when a life is no longer worth living? Can economic burden, emotional fatigue or social pressure subtly influence such decisions? In a country with vast inequalities in healthcare, the fear of misuse is not unfounded.

What complicates the debate in India is the absence of robust palliative care infrastructure. In many parts of the country, prolonging life is not a technological excess but a desperate struggle for access to basic treatment. The ethical discourse of euthanasia risks becoming distorted in such a setting.

Moreover, the process itself remains cumbersome. Unlike some Western nations where advance directives and living wills are more seamlessly implemented, India requires multiple layers of medical opinion, documentation and often legal validation. The intent is caution. The effect can be delay.

And yet, something fundamental has changed. The Court’s words to Rana’s parents are telling. Allowing a loved one to go, it observed, is not abandonment but an act of profound love.

That sentiment marks a subtle but significant shift. Death, in this framing, is not the enemy. Undignified dying is.

The law has taken a step forward. Society will take longer. Between reverence for life and acceptance of death lies a narrow, uneasy bridge. India has just begun to cross it.

Pakistan became a vassal state long back, Mr Khawaja Asif!

Raju Korti
When Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif raised the spectre of his country being reduced to a “vassal state” in the unfolding Iran-Israel-United States conflict, he appeared to be projecting a future threat. In reality, he was describing a long-settled condition.

For the uninitiated, a vassal state is a subordinate nation that holds some internal autonomy but is dominated by a more powerful state in its foreign policy and military affairs. Dependent on the superior power, such states are typically obligated to provide military support, align strategically, or adhere to dictated policies in exchange for economic and political patronage. By this definition, Pakistan’s trajectory since the late 1970s reads less like sovereign assertion and more like calibrated dependency.

Khawaja Asif (Wikipedia grab)

During the Soviet–Afghan War, Pakistan positioned itself as the frontline state of the American Cold War enterprise. The military regime of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq became the conduit for American and Saudi money, arms, and intelligence to the Afghan mujahideen. The arrangement suited Rawalpindi’s strategic depth doctrine. It also entrenched structural dependence. Billions of dollars flowed in. Policy space narrowed.

The pattern persisted through the Gulf War. While publicly cautious, Pakistan quietly aligned with Washington’s regional architecture. Its military elite understood the hierarchy. The price of Western military hardware, debt rescheduling, and diplomatic shielding at forums such as the IMF and World Bank was compliance, not confrontation. 

After 9/11, the script became explicit. Under Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan reversed overnight from Taliban patron to indispensable American ally in the so-called War on Terror. Airbases were opened. Intelligence pipelines were activated. Logistics corridors were secured. In return came Coalition Support Funds and the resumption of military aid. Public sentiment seethed. The establishment calculated.

Asif’s claim that Pakistan might be encircled by hostile powers if Israel’s regional footprint expands overlooks a simple truth. Islamabad has repeatedly chosen alignment with Washington even when that choice collided with domestic narratives about Zionism or American imperialism. If Israeli and American objectives converge against Iran, Pakistan’s room for manoeuvre will be defined not by ideology but by economic fragility and military calculus.

Pakistan’s elite may rail against Zionism. The Pakistani street may detest American foreign policy. Yet at each strategic fork, from the anti-Soviet jihad to post-9/11 counter-terrorism cooperation, the state has fallen in line with Washington’s priorities. That pattern is not ideological affinity. It is structural dependence.

It is also inaccurate to suggest that the United States is simply captive to a monolithic Zionist force. There is indeed an influential and highly organised pro-Israel lobby in the United States. Groups such as American Israel Public Affairs Committee operate through lobbying, campaign contributions, and public advocacy, much like the National Rifle Association or AARP. The American Jewish community constitutes roughly 2 percent of the population but is politically engaged and well represented in policymaking circles. However, to argue that global powers are held hostage by Zionism collapses complex institutional dynamics into conspiracy shorthand. American Middle East policy reflects strategic calculations, domestic politics, energy security concerns, and alliance commitments. Israel is a critical ally, but not a puppeteer.

Even if one accepts that Israeli pressure has nudged Washington into confrontation with Iran, the more pertinent question is Pakistan’s agency. Would Islamabad defy American sanctions regimes? Would it risk IMF programmes or FATF scrutiny to back Tehran materially? History suggests otherwise.

What hurts Pakistan’s ego most is not external pressure. It is the awareness that strategic autonomy has long been traded for economic survival. The contradictions are stark.

Pakistan once nurtured the Afghan Taliban as a lever against Indian influence in Kabul. Today it battles the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which draws ideological sustenance from the same ecosystem. Islamabad demands action from the Taliban government in Afghanistan while denying that its own past policies incubated cross-border militancy.

In Balochistan, the state confronts a long-running insurgency fuelled by grievances over resource extraction, political marginalisation, and security excesses. The province is central to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, itself a product of dependency on Beijing as an alternative patron. Thus, Pakistan juggles two suzerains. It balances American security expectations with Chinese economic leverage, while domestic fault lines widen.

These are not symptoms of encirclement by Israel, India, Afghanistan, and Iran acting in concert. They are manifestations of internal policy incoherence.

Asif’s warning that an Israeli victory could align India, Afghanistan, and Iran against Pakistan stretches plausibility. India and Iran share limited strategic convergence beyond transactional concerns. Tehran’s relations with Kabul remain fraught over refugees and water disputes. Afghanistan under the Taliban has little ideological affinity with New Delhi. The idea of a seamless anti-Pakistan bloc ignores deep fissures among these states.

More importantly, Pakistan’s vulnerability does not stem from an Israeli tank column reaching its border. It stems from economic precarity, overreliance on external bailouts, and a security doctrine that oscillates between patronage and paranoia.

If Pakistan’s leadership were candid, it would admit that alignment with Washington during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Gulf War, and the post-9/11 era was not coerced but chosen. It was deemed rational within the logic of regime survival and institutional interest. The cost was diminished autonomy in foreign and security policy.

To describe the current Iran crisis as an externally imposed plot risks evading that history. Pakistan does not face the prospect of becoming a vassal state because of Israel’s ambitions. It confronts the consequences of decades spent outsourcing strategic security to larger powers while cultivating domestic narratives of defiance.

Khawaja Asif’s warning may resonate with nationalist sentiment. It does not alter the structural reality. Sovereignty is not lost in a single war. It is eroded through repeated bargains where expediency outruns independence.

Pakistan crossed that threshold long ago.

The geometry of power in Hexagon Alliance!

Raju Korti
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi winds up his two-day visit to Israel, Netanyahu’s brainchild, the “Hexagon Alliance”, has travelled quickly from diplomatic corridors to strategic chatter. I find the term intriguing, not because alliances are new, but because branding in geopolitics often signals intent before architecture.

The idea, pitched by Benjamin Netanyahu, visualises a six-nation alignment to counter what he calls a radical Shia axis. While the precise composition remains fluid, India and Israel are seen as pivotal, with potential inclusion of countries such as the United States and key West Asian partners. The structure is still not formally codified. That raises the first question. Is this alliance new or merely a repackaging of existing convergences?

(Pic representational)

In truth, it is both old and new. India and Israel have enjoyed deep strategic ties since the 1990s. Intelligence cooperation, counter-terrorism coordination, drone technology, missile systems, and cyber capabilities form a dense web of engagement. The United States has long been a security guarantor in the region. Gulf states have quietly recalibrated their alignments after the Abraham Accords. The novelty lies in presenting these strands as a coherent bloc.

The geopolitical objective appears straightforward. Contain Iran’s influence, check radical networks, secure maritime routes, and consolidate a pro-stability arc stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indo Pacific. This is how the Hexagon geometry shapes out in a rapidly fragmenting world order. A hexagon suggests symmetry and shared responsibility. But ground realities of geopolitics are rarely known to offer perfect shapes.

I surmise that this alliance might work not as a NATO style military pact but more likely through layered cooperation. intelligence sharing. joint military exercises, coordinated cyber defence, maritime domain awareness, technology transfers and diplomatic signalling at multilateral forums. The operational core would be flexible, allowing members to participate in specific verticals without binding treaty obligations.

India’s role would be delicate but decisive. New Delhi has strategic autonomy as a cardinal principle. It balances relations with Iran for energy and connectivity, with the Gulf for diaspora and remittances, with Israel for defence technology, and with the United States for strategic leverage against China. Joining any overtly anti-Shia or anti-Muslim bloc would complicate India’s carefully curated West Asian equilibrium. My reading is if India participates, it would likely frame the alliance in terms of counter-terrorism, stability, and economic security rather than sectarian alignment.

Israel’s role would be sharper. It seeks regional normalisation and a coalition that deters Iran. By bringing India into a visible framework, Israel internationalises its security concerns and adds demographic and economic heft. Netanyahu’s pitch is as much about optics as about operational synergy.

Pakistan’s reaction is telling. Islamabad has termed it an anti-Muslim Ummah bloc, and its Senate has passed a unanimous resolution condemning the proposal. The rhetorical framing reveals anxiety. Pakistan worries about strategic encirclement. An India-Israel axis, especially if backed by Washington and Gulf capitals, narrows Islamabad’s manoeuvring space. It also risks exposing Pakistan’s internal sectarian fault lines in a polarised regional narrative.

Whether this alliance will change ground realities depends on three variables. First, clarity of purpose. If the hexagon remains a slogan, it will fade. Second, leadership. Who will call the shots? The United States would naturally command military heft, but Washington’s inclination towards new entanglements at this juncture appears uncertain. Israel will push security priorities. India will insist on consensus and issue-based engagement. Gulf states will weigh domestic sensitivities. Decision making may evolve through a steering mechanism rather than a single hegemon.

Third, the China factor. Beijing’s deepening footprint in West Asia through energy deals and infrastructure investments cannot be ignored. Any new bloc will be read in Beijing as part of a larger containment lattice. That adds another layer of strategic complexity.

The stakes are high. From energy security to counter-terrorism intelligence, cyber warfare preparedness. and arms supply chains. At the same time, the risks are also real. Sectarian polarisation. proxy escalations and diplomatic backlash from non-aligned partners. For India in particular, reputational balance in the Global South is crucial.

In lighter vein, I sometimes wonder whether South Asia needs a Hexagon of its own. Imagine a cricketing alliance of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and either UAE or Oman as host. A super tournament that would dominate Asian cricket and television ratings. The infrastructure of UAE or Oman is ready. The passion is unquestioned. The diplomacy, however, would be fiercer than any final. Managing India Pakistan tensions would require more skill than negotiating a ceasefire. Yet sport has often succeeded where politics hesitates.

But geopolitics is not cricket. A hexagon in strategy is less about trophies and more about deterrence. Whether this particular hexagon becomes a solid structure or remains a rhetorical polygon will depend on how carefully its architects align ambition with realism.

For now, the geometry has caught attention. The angles will determine the outcome.