Living under the shadow of growing nuclear deterrence!

Raju Korti
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s latest report offers a stark reminder that while the Cold War may have ended, the nuclear age has not receded into history. Instead, it has entered a more complex and arguably more dangerous phase. The global inventory of nuclear warheads, estimated at roughly 12,000 to 13,000, remains concentrated among a handful of major powers, with the United States and Russia accounting for nearly ninety percent of the total. Both nations continue to maintain thousands of deployed and reserve warheads, many of them on high operational readiness, capable of being launched within minutes.

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China’s nuclear arsenal, though significantly smaller, is expanding at a pace that has drawn international attention. Estimates suggest Beijing now possesses over 400 warheads, with projections indicating further growth as it modernises its delivery systems and builds new missile silos. France and the United Kingdom maintain comparatively modest but technologically advanced arsenals, designed primarily for deterrence. India and Pakistan, locked in a historically fraught regional rivalry, continue to incrementally build their stockpiles, with India estimated to have around 170 to 180 warheads and Pakistan slightly more. Israel maintains deliberate ambiguity about its capabilities, while North Korea’s arsenal remains opaque but steadily advancing.

What distinguishes the current moment from earlier decades is not merely the number of weapons, but the context in which they exist. The Cold War, for all its dangers, was structured around a relatively stable bipolar rivalry with established communication channels and arms control frameworks. Today’s landscape is far more fragmented. Strategic competition now spans multiple theatres, from Eastern Europe to the Indo-Pacific, with overlapping rivalries and fewer guardrails. The erosion of arms control agreements, such as the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the uncertain future of New START, has further weakened mechanisms that once imposed limits and transparency.

Equally concerning is the technological evolution accompanying nuclear arsenals. Advances in hypersonic delivery systems, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence are compressing decision-making timelines and introducing new uncertainties. The risk is no longer confined to deliberate escalation but extends to miscalculation, system failures, or cyber interference. In such an environment, deterrence becomes both more critical and more precarious.

India’s nuclear posture occupies a distinct place within this global framework. Its doctrine of No First Use has long been projected as a stabilising commitment, signalling that nuclear weapons are intended solely as a retaliatory measure. This position, coupled with a policy of credible minimum deterrence, seeks to balance strategic necessity with restraint. However, evolving regional dynamics, particularly China’s expansion and Pakistan’s tactical nuclear developments, continue to test the durability and interpretation of this doctrine. While India has officially reiterated its commitment to No First Use, debates persist within strategic circles about its future applicability under extreme scenarios.

The doctrines of other nuclear powers vary significantly. The United States and NATO retain the option of first use under certain circumstances, integrating nuclear weapons into broader defence strategies. Russia’s doctrine similarly allows for nuclear use in response to existential threats, with some interpretations suggesting a lowered threshold through concepts like escalation for de-escalation. China officially maintains a No First Use policy, though its rapid arsenal expansion has led to questions about how this stance will evolve. Pakistan, in contrast, explicitly rejects No First Use, viewing nuclear weapons as essential to offset conventional military asymmetry with India.

Despite these doctrinal differences, a common thread runs through all nuclear-armed states: none show any inclination towards complete disarmament. Modernisation programmes are underway across the board, encompassing new warheads, delivery systems, and command structures. Nuclear weapons, far from being relics of a bygone era, remain deeply embedded in national security doctrines.

This reality leads to an uncomfortable but unavoidable conclusion. The world continues to rely on nuclear deterrence as a guarantor of strategic stability, even as the risks associated with it multiply. The paradox is stark. These weapons are seen as essential precisely because their use would be catastrophic beyond comprehension. Since the end of the Second World War, their presence has arguably prevented large-scale conflicts between major powers. Yet, their continued existence ensures that humanity lives under the constant shadow of annihilation.

In an era marked by persistent conflicts, shifting alliances, and rising nationalism, the hope that nuclear weapons will never be used becomes both fragile and indispensable. The absence of any serious movement towards disarmament suggests that these arsenals are here to stay. The challenge, therefore, lies not in imagining a world without them in the immediate future, but in ensuring that they remain what they have largely been since 1945: instruments of deterrence, never of deployment.

The danger today is subtler but deeper than in decades past. It lies in the erosion of norms, the diffusion of power, and the speed of technological change. The nuclear balance is no longer a static equation but a shifting, unpredictable landscape. In such a world, restraint, communication, and renewed commitment to arms control are not idealistic aspirations but urgent necessities.