The geometry of power in Hexagon Alliance!

Raju Korti
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi winds up his two-day visit to Israel, Netanyahu’s brainchild, the “Hexagon Alliance”, has travelled quickly from diplomatic corridors to strategic chatter. I find the term intriguing, not because alliances are new, but because branding in geopolitics often signals intent before architecture.

The idea, pitched by Benjamin Netanyahu, visualises a six-nation alignment to counter what he calls a radical Shia axis. While the precise composition remains fluid, India and Israel are seen as pivotal, with potential inclusion of countries such as the United States and key West Asian partners. The structure is still not formally codified. That raises the first question. Is this alliance new or merely a repackaging of existing convergences?

(Pic representational)

In truth, it is both old and new. India and Israel have enjoyed deep strategic ties since the 1990s. Intelligence cooperation, counter-terrorism coordination, drone technology, missile systems, and cyber capabilities form a dense web of engagement. The United States has long been a security guarantor in the region. Gulf states have quietly recalibrated their alignments after the Abraham Accords. The novelty lies in presenting these strands as a coherent bloc.

The geopolitical objective appears straightforward. Contain Iran’s influence, check radical networks, secure maritime routes, and consolidate a pro-stability arc stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indo Pacific. This is how the Hexagon geometry shapes out in a rapidly fragmenting world order. A hexagon suggests symmetry and shared responsibility. But ground realities of geopolitics are rarely known to offer perfect shapes.

I surmise that this alliance might work not as a NATO style military pact but more likely through layered cooperation. intelligence sharing. joint military exercises, coordinated cyber defence, maritime domain awareness, technology transfers and diplomatic signalling at multilateral forums. The operational core would be flexible, allowing members to participate in specific verticals without binding treaty obligations.

India’s role would be delicate but decisive. New Delhi has strategic autonomy as a cardinal principle. It balances relations with Iran for energy and connectivity, with the Gulf for diaspora and remittances, with Israel for defence technology, and with the United States for strategic leverage against China. Joining any overtly anti-Shia or anti-Muslim bloc would complicate India’s carefully curated West Asian equilibrium. My reading is if India participates, it would likely frame the alliance in terms of counter-terrorism, stability, and economic security rather than sectarian alignment.

Israel’s role would be sharper. It seeks regional normalisation and a coalition that deters Iran. By bringing India into a visible framework, Israel internationalises its security concerns and adds demographic and economic heft. Netanyahu’s pitch is as much about optics as about operational synergy.

Pakistan’s reaction is telling. Islamabad has termed it an anti-Muslim Ummah bloc, and its Senate has passed a unanimous resolution condemning the proposal. The rhetorical framing reveals anxiety. Pakistan worries about strategic encirclement. An India-Israel axis, especially if backed by Washington and Gulf capitals, narrows Islamabad’s manoeuvring space. It also risks exposing Pakistan’s internal sectarian fault lines in a polarised regional narrative.

Whether this alliance will change ground realities depends on three variables. First, clarity of purpose. If the hexagon remains a slogan, it will fade. Second, leadership. Who will call the shots? The United States would naturally command military heft, but Washington’s inclination towards new entanglements at this juncture appears uncertain. Israel will push security priorities. India will insist on consensus and issue-based engagement. Gulf states will weigh domestic sensitivities. Decision making may evolve through a steering mechanism rather than a single hegemon.

Third, the China factor. Beijing’s deepening footprint in West Asia through energy deals and infrastructure investments cannot be ignored. Any new bloc will be read in Beijing as part of a larger containment lattice. That adds another layer of strategic complexity.

The stakes are high. From energy security to counter-terrorism intelligence, cyber warfare preparedness. and arms supply chains. At the same time, the risks are also real. Sectarian polarisation. proxy escalations and diplomatic backlash from non-aligned partners. For India in particular, reputational balance in the Global South is crucial.

In lighter vein, I sometimes wonder whether South Asia needs a Hexagon of its own. Imagine a cricketing alliance of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and either UAE or Oman as host. A super tournament that would dominate Asian cricket and television ratings. The infrastructure of UAE or Oman is ready. The passion is unquestioned. The diplomacy, however, would be fiercer than any final. Managing India Pakistan tensions would require more skill than negotiating a ceasefire. Yet sport has often succeeded where politics hesitates.

But geopolitics is not cricket. A hexagon in strategy is less about trophies and more about deterrence. Whether this particular hexagon becomes a solid structure or remains a rhetorical polygon will depend on how carefully its architects align ambition with realism.

For now, the geometry has caught attention. The angles will determine the outcome.