Raju Korti
The only real mistake is the one from which we learn nothing. Long since it fought a disastrous war with China in 1962, the Indian government seems to have learnt precious little. The Chinese are not known to give empty threats. Three weeks into the Sikkim stand off with China, the Communist country has warned of a even more severe backlash. China believes India is using its military might as a leverage in Sikkim and thus a case of blatant provocation.
The Indian Army's track record has been impeccable but the 1962 war, which caught it off guard, remains a black spot on its reputation. To be fair to the Army, the war was lost much before it moved to defend the country, thanks to the spineless political leadership of the time.
Political leaders including the Leftists and then home minister Krishna Menon in their considered wisdom thought that the Chinese were merely indulging in sabre rattling. However, once the conflict started, even old friend USSR left India to fend for herself.
Such was the ineptitude and carelessness of the government of the day that it even ignored a carefully prepared report of the Army about China's impending aggression. The stone-faced Krishna Menon, close chum of Jawaharlal Nehru, seemed to live in their ivory towers. Had the warnings been heeded to, India would have been spared of the blushes and tragedy of a massive defeat and large number of casualties.Clearly, the Indian government, without a think-tank, had underestimated the Chinese resolve. The attack happened when the country's leadership was sitting and discussing policies that were utterly unrealistic, not realizing that a treacherous, expansionist neighbour cannot and should never be trusted. As it turned out, the attack in Ladakh and Arunachal (then NEFA), took the incompetent leadership by complete surprise. To cap it all, a post war report laid the blame squarely the Chief of Army Staff and Chief of General Staff for the debacle.
Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai was a standard diplomatic line that got undue and unfounded importance in the late 50s and early 60s from the likes of Nehru. Though the reasons for this sudden build up of such high levels of trust on China was befuddling, it was actually utter foolishness. As events unfolded, this over-affectionate posturing towards China spelled doom.
From what emerged of the post-war reports, it was India who provoked the Chinese Army despite being well aware that it lacked the capacity to take the latter head on. The trigger was also a provocative statement that Nehru made and irked Mao Zedong.
It is widely believed that the Indian Army ran out of food, artillery and ammo supplies during the war. The back up was weak and a long status quo only resulted in compounding the situation on the border. In short, logistical failure was also among the reason why the Indians took a beating.
The most embarrassing part of the story was the weak and inefficient political leadership. Nehru leaned too much on a tactless Menon who just wasn't able to anticipate the seriousness of the situation. India lost far too many soldiers because of poor leadership.
If the leadership was inane and ludicrous, the Army was thoroughly unprepared. Though particularly impressive in its own backyard, absence of strategy and advanced weapons was a recipe for disaster. From the war emerged an Army whose morale had chafed.
That was 55 years ago. Today if India's military might has gone up manifold, so has China's. That brings the stand off situation to Square One. Moral of the story: The error of the past is the wisdom and success of the future.
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| Chou en Lai and Nehru: Comrades in arms! |
The Indian Army's track record has been impeccable but the 1962 war, which caught it off guard, remains a black spot on its reputation. To be fair to the Army, the war was lost much before it moved to defend the country, thanks to the spineless political leadership of the time.
Political leaders including the Leftists and then home minister Krishna Menon in their considered wisdom thought that the Chinese were merely indulging in sabre rattling. However, once the conflict started, even old friend USSR left India to fend for herself.
Such was the ineptitude and carelessness of the government of the day that it even ignored a carefully prepared report of the Army about China's impending aggression. The stone-faced Krishna Menon, close chum of Jawaharlal Nehru, seemed to live in their ivory towers. Had the warnings been heeded to, India would have been spared of the blushes and tragedy of a massive defeat and large number of casualties.Clearly, the Indian government, without a think-tank, had underestimated the Chinese resolve. The attack happened when the country's leadership was sitting and discussing policies that were utterly unrealistic, not realizing that a treacherous, expansionist neighbour cannot and should never be trusted. As it turned out, the attack in Ladakh and Arunachal (then NEFA), took the incompetent leadership by complete surprise. To cap it all, a post war report laid the blame squarely the Chief of Army Staff and Chief of General Staff for the debacle.
Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai was a standard diplomatic line that got undue and unfounded importance in the late 50s and early 60s from the likes of Nehru. Though the reasons for this sudden build up of such high levels of trust on China was befuddling, it was actually utter foolishness. As events unfolded, this over-affectionate posturing towards China spelled doom.
From what emerged of the post-war reports, it was India who provoked the Chinese Army despite being well aware that it lacked the capacity to take the latter head on. The trigger was also a provocative statement that Nehru made and irked Mao Zedong.
It is widely believed that the Indian Army ran out of food, artillery and ammo supplies during the war. The back up was weak and a long status quo only resulted in compounding the situation on the border. In short, logistical failure was also among the reason why the Indians took a beating.
The most embarrassing part of the story was the weak and inefficient political leadership. Nehru leaned too much on a tactless Menon who just wasn't able to anticipate the seriousness of the situation. India lost far too many soldiers because of poor leadership.
If the leadership was inane and ludicrous, the Army was thoroughly unprepared. Though particularly impressive in its own backyard, absence of strategy and advanced weapons was a recipe for disaster. From the war emerged an Army whose morale had chafed.
That was 55 years ago. Today if India's military might has gone up manifold, so has China's. That brings the stand off situation to Square One. Moral of the story: The error of the past is the wisdom and success of the future.
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