Raju Korti
When Pakistan’s Defence Minister
Khawaja Asif raised the spectre of his country being reduced to a “vassal
state” in the unfolding Iran-Israel-United States conflict, he appeared to be
projecting a future threat. In reality, he was describing a long-settled
condition.
For the uninitiated, a vassal state is a subordinate nation that holds some internal autonomy but is dominated by a more powerful state in its foreign policy and military affairs. Dependent on the superior power, such states are typically obligated to provide military support, align strategically, or adhere to dictated policies in exchange for economic and political patronage. By this definition, Pakistan’s trajectory since the late 1970s reads less like sovereign assertion and more like calibrated dependency.
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| Khawaja Asif (Wikipedia grab) |
The pattern persisted through the Gulf War. While publicly cautious, Pakistan quietly aligned with Washington’s regional architecture. Its military elite understood the hierarchy. The price of Western military hardware, debt rescheduling, and diplomatic shielding at forums such as the IMF and World Bank was compliance, not confrontation.
After 9/11, the script became explicit. Under Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan reversed overnight from Taliban patron to indispensable American ally in the so-called War on Terror. Airbases were opened. Intelligence pipelines were activated. Logistics corridors were secured. In return came Coalition Support Funds and the resumption of military aid. Public sentiment seethed. The establishment calculated.
Asif’s claim that Pakistan might be encircled by hostile powers if Israel’s regional footprint expands overlooks a simple truth. Islamabad has repeatedly chosen alignment with Washington even when that choice collided with domestic narratives about Zionism or American imperialism. If Israeli and American objectives converge against Iran, Pakistan’s room for manoeuvre will be defined not by ideology but by economic fragility and military calculus.
Pakistan’s elite may rail against Zionism. The Pakistani street may detest American foreign policy. Yet at each strategic fork, from the anti-Soviet jihad to post-9/11 counter-terrorism cooperation, the state has fallen in line with Washington’s priorities. That pattern is not ideological affinity. It is structural dependence.
It is also inaccurate to suggest that the United States is simply captive to a monolithic Zionist force. There is indeed an influential and highly organised pro-Israel lobby in the United States. Groups such as American Israel Public Affairs Committee operate through lobbying, campaign contributions, and public advocacy, much like the National Rifle Association or AARP. The American Jewish community constitutes roughly 2 percent of the population but is politically engaged and well represented in policymaking circles. However, to argue that global powers are held hostage by Zionism collapses complex institutional dynamics into conspiracy shorthand. American Middle East policy reflects strategic calculations, domestic politics, energy security concerns, and alliance commitments. Israel is a critical ally, but not a puppeteer.
Even if one accepts that Israeli pressure has nudged Washington into confrontation with Iran, the more pertinent question is Pakistan’s agency. Would Islamabad defy American sanctions regimes? Would it risk IMF programmes or FATF scrutiny to back Tehran materially? History suggests otherwise.
What hurts Pakistan’s ego most is not external pressure. It is the awareness that strategic autonomy has long been traded for economic survival. The contradictions are stark.
Pakistan once nurtured the Afghan Taliban as a lever against Indian influence in Kabul. Today it battles the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which draws ideological sustenance from the same ecosystem. Islamabad demands action from the Taliban government in Afghanistan while denying that its own past policies incubated cross-border militancy.
In Balochistan, the state confronts a long-running insurgency fuelled by grievances over resource extraction, political marginalisation, and security excesses. The province is central to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, itself a product of dependency on Beijing as an alternative patron. Thus, Pakistan juggles two suzerains. It balances American security expectations with Chinese economic leverage, while domestic fault lines widen.
These are not symptoms of encirclement by Israel, India, Afghanistan, and Iran acting in concert. They are manifestations of internal policy incoherence.
Asif’s warning that an Israeli victory could align India, Afghanistan, and Iran against Pakistan stretches plausibility. India and Iran share limited strategic convergence beyond transactional concerns. Tehran’s relations with Kabul remain fraught over refugees and water disputes. Afghanistan under the Taliban has little ideological affinity with New Delhi. The idea of a seamless anti-Pakistan bloc ignores deep fissures among these states.
More importantly, Pakistan’s vulnerability does not stem from an Israeli tank column reaching its border. It stems from economic precarity, overreliance on external bailouts, and a security doctrine that oscillates between patronage and paranoia.
If Pakistan’s leadership were candid, it would admit that alignment with Washington during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Gulf War, and the post-9/11 era was not coerced but chosen. It was deemed rational within the logic of regime survival and institutional interest. The cost was diminished autonomy in foreign and security policy.
To describe the current Iran crisis as an externally imposed plot risks evading that history. Pakistan does not face the prospect of becoming a vassal state because of Israel’s ambitions. It confronts the consequences of decades spent outsourcing strategic security to larger powers while cultivating domestic narratives of defiance.
Khawaja Asif’s warning may resonate with nationalist sentiment. It does not alter the structural reality. Sovereignty is not lost in a single war. It is eroded through repeated bargains where expediency outruns independence.
Pakistan crossed that threshold long ago.
