‘Islamic NATO’: Cross between new security axis and dangerous Illusion

Raju Korti
The notion of an “Islamic NATO” sounds dramatic, but at its core is a simple idea. A few Muslim-majority countries are discussing a defence pact where an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all. In very basic terms, this mirrors how NATO has traditionally been understood, especially its famous Article 5 clause. If one ally is attacked, the rest step in. That promise of collective response is meant to deter enemies even before a conflict begins.

In the proposed arrangement involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the logic is similar but the context is very different. NATO emerged after the Second World War among relatively like-minded Western democracies, under clear American leadership, facing a defined threat from the Soviet bloc. The proposed Islamic grouping is emerging in a far more fractured world, where threats are multiple, alliances are fluid and trust between partners is limited and often tactical.

Strategically, each of the three countries brings something distinct. Saudi Arabia offers financial muscle and influence across the Arab world. Pakistan contributes nuclear capability, missile strength and a large standing military. Turkey adds combat experience, a sophisticated and expanding defence industry and the credibility of being a long-time NATO member itself. On paper, this looks like a formidable combination. On the ground, translating these assets into a seamless collective security system is far more complicated.

The immediate regional impact would be psychological as much as military. Such a pact could signal to rivals that these countries are willing to close ranks if challenged. It could also give Turkey an added sense of security at a time when confidence in Western guarantees is weakening. President Donald Trump’s repeated questioning of NATO commitments, his transactional approach to alliances and his unpredictable diplomacy have made even traditional allies uneasy. This uncertainty is one of the main reasons countries like Turkey are hedging their bets.

However, equating this grouping fully with NATO is misleading. NATO is backed by deep institutional structures, integrated command systems, shared intelligence mechanisms and decades of operational experience together. It also has a clear legal and political framework that binds members, even if frictions exist. The proposed Islamic pact, at least for now, appears more like a strategic understanding than a fully fleshed-out alliance. It lacks clarity on decision-making, rules of engagement and what kind of response would actually follow an attack.

The question of takers is equally complex. The Muslim world is not a single political or strategic bloc. Iran, a major regional power, would view such a Sunni-leaning arrangement with suspicion, even if Turkey and Saudi Arabia prefer engagement over confrontation. Countries like Egypt, Indonesia and Malaysia may be cautious about joining a pact that could drag them into conflicts far from their borders. Smaller Gulf states may weigh the benefits of protection against the risks of antagonising other powers. Many will prefer flexibility over firm commitments.

For India, the implications are sensitive. Any closer military alignment involving Pakistan is watched carefully in New Delhi. Even if the pact is not explicitly anti-India, the inclusion of collective defence language could embolden Pakistan diplomatically and psychologically. It may complicate India’s strategic calculations, especially if Turkey continues to take vocal positions on issues like Kashmir. At the same time, India is unlikely to see this as an immediate military threat, given the internal contradictions and limits of the proposed alliance.

Afghanistan sits in an even more precarious position. Pakistan’s tensions with Kabul, accusations around militant sanctuaries and the fragile Taliban-led state mean that any regional military bloc involving Pakistan could deepen Afghan insecurities. Mediation efforts by Turkey and Qatar show that diplomacy is still preferred, but a defence pact does little to reassure a country already struggling with legitimacy, stability and isolation.

The stance of other Islamic or Muslim-majority countries will likely be pragmatic rather than ideological. Many will ask a simple question. Does this pact enhance security without limiting independence? If the answer is unclear, they will stay on the sidelines. History shows that attempts to build pan-Islamic military alliances often falter due to national interests, rivalries and differing threat perceptions.

In the long run, the workability of an “Islamic NATO” depends on political will and trust, not just weapons and money. Collective defence only works when members are willing to act, even when it is costly. Without that certainty, the pact risks becoming more symbolic than strategic.

As for changing the world order, this looks less like a revolution and more like a symptom. It reflects a world where old alliances are under strain, American reliability is questioned and middle powers are searching for insurance policies. Whether this particular idea matures into a lasting structure or fades into the long list of ambitious but unrealised security arrangements will depend on events yet to unfold. For now, it is an interesting signal, not a settled fact.